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STUDENT NOTE
Diminishing Property Rights
If Americans held land in a truly allodial fashion, each land-
owner could do as he pleased without concern for the rights of
others. However, this is impossible in an organized society. As
the growing importance of the community dawns upon man's con-
sciousness, the individual's rights must yield to the best interest
of society. As changes in political philosophy increase the import-
ance of the state over the individual, limitations on his property
are necessarily increased.' This paper examines several areas in
which property rights have diminished. Because several of these
areas have their roots in common law, it is necessary to examine
briefly the historical development of real property law in England.
I TnoMmsoN, RE.AL PROPERTY § 3 (4th ed. 1964).
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Anglo-American land law starts with the system of land owner-
ship which had been brought to England from northern Germany
by the Angles and Saxons in a series of migrations from about
450 to 600 A.D. Entire communities were transferred, establishing
in England the Germanic village community.' The Germanic
customary law of land ownership under which these village
communities were organized and governed developed the concept
of individual ownership. The usual freeholder owned a house, out-
buildings and land for cultivation.3 This land was alloidal, owner
absolutely with no tenure or holding of an overlord or King.4
However, the Norman Conquest of England in 1066 changed the
course of English property law. Initially, William, the Norman
leader, had only a small area of land, beyond which was a hostile
populace. His primary need was to keep his followers from re-
turning to their homeland - to insure their loyalty. He accom-
plished this by exploiting the basic medium of life - land.5
William declared all the land in England forfeited to him.
He then subjected the land to tenurial land holding devices, with the
king as the paramount lord-granting tracts to various lesser lords
in return for their allegiance.6 An analysis of the tenurial system
makes it clear that throughout its history the common law doctrine
of estates recognized the state as the underlying owner of real
property.
Passage of time eliminated the original needs which fostered the
feudal system and the continued existence of many tenurial "in-
cidents" became a source of unnecessary abuse. Through wars
which resulted in the deaths of many mesne lords and the Statute
of Quia Emptores, which abolished the process of subinfeudation,
much of the feudal system disappeared. Finally in 1660, Parliament
enacted a statute which abolished the feudal incidents by converting
all land into socage tenure with the result that only three aspects of
the tenurial system remained: escheat, relief and the basic idea that
land is held rather than owned.' Even today the concept that the
2 WASH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO AimcAN LAW 6 (2d ed. 1932).
3 DIGBY, HISTORY OF ThE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 5 (5th ed. 1847).
4 Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-in: Evolving Property Concepts, 44 B.U.L.
Rv. 435 (1964).5 Id. at 444.
6 WALsI1, op. cit. supra note 2, at 33.
7 Hcnrr, supra note 4, at 450.
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state alone retains ultimate ownership of reality remains embedded
in the English common law.
The English colonists in America brought with them the ele-
ments of the English common law of real property. The land
grant was held in free and common socage and not in capite by
knight service. The owner was required to pay homage to no one.
However, even though the feudal system had been essentially
discarded, many aspects of our real property law require for their
understanding a remembrance that our law is based on English
common law which grew up while the feudal system was in force.'
Of primary importance is the fact that land held alloidally is owned
subject to certain rights reserved in the state including the police
power, taxation, eminent domain and escheat.9 It is through a
development of these and other reserved rights of the state that
there has been a gradual diminution of property rights.
Blackstone defined a property right as that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises
over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the
rights of any other individual in the universe.'"
Complete property as described in the Restatement of Property is
the totality of the rights and privileges, powers and immunities that
a person may have with regard to a particular tract of land."
However, in America the theory of absolute ownership is not a
prevailing one,'" and dominion over, use, development, misuse or
other treatment of land by an owner in fee simple has materially
diminished in recent years. 3 The result has been a relegation of
the landowner to a position which "hesitatingly embodies an in-
gredient of stewardship."' 4
It is the purpose of this note to examine briefly several areas
in which the ancient idea that one who owned property could use
the property as he pleased without regard to the rights of others has
8 1 TnoMESON, Op. cit. supra note 1, §39.
9 In re Waltz, 197 Cal. App. 263, 240 Pac. 19 (1925).
"I 1 BLACKSTONE, ComamNTARiEs 329 (Cooley's ed. 1871).
" 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §5 (1936).
'
2 MACCHESNEY, CHANGING CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY, 24 A.B.A.J. 70
(1938).
135 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 494 (1962).
'4 Cross, The Diminishing Fee, 20 LAw & CoNTEm'. PROB. 517 (1955).
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been subordinated to greater rights. Several of these areas have
descended to American property law from English common law
while others have resulted from our highly developed civilization.
But almost all the areas are intrinsically interwoven.
Police Power
Police power is as old as civilized governments. Blackstone de-
fined police power as:
the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom, whereby
the individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed
family, are bound to conform their general behavior to the rules of
propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be
decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations. 5
As a general rule, the owner of real estate in fee simple has the
right to use it for any lawful purpose."6 His use is limited only by
the proper exercise of the police power." No rule in constitutional
law is better settled than the principle that all property is held sub-
ject to the rights of the state to regulate its use under the police
power to secure the safety, welfare, good order and morals of the
community.'" Moreover, police power is a dynamic concept, en-
larging and adapting itself to the emerging view of vital social
needs.' 9 Evidence of this is readily apparent in the zoning area
which will be discussed as an independent topic in this note.
The exercise of the police owner may not only result in the loss
or limitation of a right once possessed by the property owner, but the
owner may very well receive no compensation for his loss. This
is because the regulation is not a taking, but rather a limitation on
the owner's use or certain purposes considered injurious to the
community.2 0
In Mugler v. Kansas,2' the state had forbidden the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquor. The claimants" breweries, built
1514 BLAcKSTONE, Co~mmmTAms ON TaE LAWS Or ENGLAND 162 (Lewis
ed. 1902).
16 England v. Atkinson, 196 Ga. 181, 26 S.E.2d 431 (1943).
17 Lee v. City of Chicago, 390 IMI. 306, 61 N.E.2d 367 (1945).
" Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
19 HEcaT, supra note 4, at 453.20 Sax, Takings and The Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 38 (1964).
21 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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when it was lawful to manufacture beer, were of little value for
other purposes. However, the court held that the claimant was not
entitled to compensation for the loss of this property right. This
was not a taking of property, but merely a limitation on the owner's
use.
With increasing frequency, the police power is used as the
derivative authority for entering new areas in which prior existing
property rights are restricted. Illustrative of this is the soil con-
servation and erosion control programs which are nationwide. Re-
gulation of the use of land for erosion control is obviously within the
scope of the police power because it, at one and the same time,
conserves natural resources, protects public lands and prevents
impairment of dams - all of these having been held appropriate
ends of the police power.22 In Benshoter v. Hakes,23 the authority
of a state to pass a statute which provided for automatic renewal of
farm leases in the absence of four months notice of termination was
questioned. The statute was designed to increase stability of farm
tenure and lessen the waste and exploitation that was found to be a
concomitant of insecurity of tenure. In finding the statute to be an
appropriate exercise of the police power, the court stated:
It is quite apparent that during recent years the old concepts
of duties and responsibilities of the owners and operators of
farmland have undergone a change. Such persons, by controlling
the food source of the nation, bear a certain responsibility to the
general public. They possess a vital part of the national wealth,
and legislation designed to stop waste and exploitation in the
interest of the general public is within the sphere of the state's
police power .... 14
Just as the duties and responsibilities of the farm dwellers in-
creased, likewise, the duties of city dwellers have also increased.
In the exercise of it's police power in the interest of public safety,
comfort and convenience, legislatures frequently regulate the erec-
tion of buildings on private property." Also regulated is the use to
which a building already constructed might be put. In Swade v.
22 Ferguson, Nation-Wide Erosion Control: Soil Conservation Districts and
the Power of Land Use Regulation, 34 IowA L. Riv. 166, 179 (1948).23 232 Iowa 1354, 1363, 8 N.W.2d 481, 487 (1943).24 Id. at 1363 8 N.W.2d at 487.
2s Kemp v. D;Oenc]h, 174 Mass. 476, 18 N.E. 862 (1888).
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zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Springfield Township, 6 the court
refused a variance to an applicant who sought to conduct a pro-
hibited business enterprise in the barn on his property in a resi-
dential zone. Although the business did not adversely affect the
health, safety or morals of the public, the general welfare of the
public was considered sufficient grounds for the holding.
Police power is based upon the concept that all property within
the jurisdiction of a state, is held on the implied condition or obliga-
tion that its use shall not be injurious to the rights of others in the
use and benefit of their own property.2" And, as populations in-
crease, more land is developed and cities expand - so likewise must
the police power grow in keeping with the maxim, "sic utere tuo
alienum non laedus,"8 and more property rights will disappear.
Aviation
"Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum" is a maxim which
translated means "he who owns the soil owns everything above and
below, from heaven to hell."29 It has been traced back as far as
1200 A.D. and cases citing it go back as far as 1586 A.D."0 The
expression was first quoted in a case which held that when a
landowner erects a house so close to a window in an adjacent
building that the light is cut off, the injured landowner cannot
complain even though his building had been built forty years
earlier." However, maxims are not law and no court has ever said
that ownership of airspace extends upward an indefinite distance.32
The maxim, "Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum," in its
practical application merely safeguarded the proprietary rights of
the landowner over the air space immediately above his land, such
as for building purposes and for protection against the encroach-
ments of trees and fences on adjoining land.2 Although the courts,
at times, have spoken of a landowners ownership of airspace super-
26 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958).
27 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Sweet v. Rechel, 159
U.S. 380 (1895).
28 "Use your own as not to injure another's property," 66 C.J.S. Nuisances
§8 (1950).2  Annot., 69 A.L.R. 316 317 (1930).
3 °Comment, 21 NonE b 5 LAW. 143 (1946).
3' Bury v. Pape, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (1586).
32 Supra note 30, at 143.
33 Supra note 29, at 318.
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol69/iss2/7
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
adjacent to his property, it is perhaps more appropriate to set forth
this concept in terms of property rights which are incidental to
land ownership.3" Evidence of this is abundant because of the
litigation which has arisen as a result of the advent of aviation. If
the maxim had been unlimited, the development of aeronautics
would have been thwarted. However, the courts have disregarded
such a liberal interpretation, and the result is a further limitation on
the rights of property owners.
As early as 1822, it was decided that ascending in a balloon was
not an unlawful act, but when the balloonist descended in a garden
and crowds rushed in and damaged plants, he became liable for
damages as a trespasser."5 In Johnson v. Curtiss No. W. Airplane
Co.,6 the plaintiff sought to enforce the maxim "whose the soil is,
his it is from the heavens to the depths of the earth," and claimed
that no matter how great the altitude of airplane flights over his
land they were trespassing. The court repudiated the maxim
stating:
This rule, like many aphorisms of the law is a generality, and
does not have its origin in legislation, but was adopted in an age
of primitive industrial development, by the courts of England
long prior to the American Revolution, as a comprehensive state-
ment of the landowner's rights, at a time when any practical
use of upper air was not considered or thought possible . . . A
wholly different situation is now presented . . . The upper air
is a natural heritage common to all people, and its reasonable
use ought not to be hampered by an ancient and artificial maxim
such as here invoked.'"
In United States v. Causby,'8 the court found that flights over
private land were not a taking of a private right unless so low and
so frequent as to be a direct interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land. So too, in Smith v. New England Aircraft Co.,"'
it was held that flights of aircraft over one's land at heights in
excess of the minimum fixed by law were lawful where there was
34 Note, 24 U. Prrr. L. REv. 603 (1963).
3- Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. R. 381, 10 Am. Dec. 234 (1822).36 1928 U.S. Av. 42. (1923).
3' Ibid.
3a328 U.S. 256 (1946).
'9270 Mass. 511 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
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no harm to the landowner or interference with any valuable func-
tion for which the land was usable.
However, where there is no physical contact, yet enjoyment of the
property is interfered with, for example, by frightening horses, it
cannot be doubted that the court's interference could be obtained to
restrain such annoyance and damage caused by the flight of an
airplane over a man's property." Repeated trespasses of the space
over one's real property, which interfere with the proper enjoyment
of the surface of the land, constitute a private nuisance."
One prominent problem with reference to aviation is what is the
vertical extent of the area of ownership of nearby land proprietors
when an airplane is taking off or landing at an airport. In United
States v. Causby,42 the Supreme Court made it clear that the verti-
cal extent of the area owned by the surface owner can reach into
the zone necessary for approach and take-off. In this case liability
was imposed on the basis of flights which were found to be a
direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use
of the land.
However, all levels of government are attempting to minimize the
expense of airport operations, particularly with reference to ap-
proach and take-off. This has been done by prohibiting the
erection of structures of such a height as to interfer with the normal
use of the airport.43 This differs from control by any other zoning
laws and its propriety is to be tested in terms of the reasonableness
of the exercise of the police power.4 Moreover, if necessary, the
involuntary relinquishment of the area by the private owner can
be compelled through condemnation pursuant to statutory authority.
This, too, is a further limitation of the landowner's freedom where
public needs are involved. 5
Navigable air space means air space above the minimum
altitudes of flight prescribed by regulations issued under this
40 Annot., 69 A.L.R. 316, 320 (1930).
41 Gay v. Taylor, 1934 U.SAv. 146 (1932).
42328 U.S. 256 (1946).
43 Cross, supra note 14, at 517.
44 Young, Airport Zoning, 1954 ILL. L. F. 261.
4 Cross, supra note 14, at 517.
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chapter and shall include airspace needed to insure safety in
take-off and landing the air craft."6
In this Congressional declaration that there is a right to use air-
space necessary for landing and taking off, the loss of nuisance as a
protection for the landowner may result." Once again modem
developments conflict with the established rights of a property
owner resulting in a further diminution of property rights.
Eminent Domain 8
The right of the sovereign to acquire private property for
public use upon making just compensation is known as the right
of eminent domain." The word itself, "eminens domium," coun-
tenances a resumption by the government of it's reserved rights
over lands parceled out to individuals. The name appears to have
been first applied to the doctrine in 1652 A.D. by Grotius to
designate the power of the sovereign state to take property within
it's jurisdiction for public use without the owner's consent.5"
Eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty which is as
enduring and indestructible as the state itself.5" It exists indepen-
dently of any constitution for no state can exist without it.5 2 As
the term itself connotes, it is superior to all private rights53 and it
is exercised by the sovereign for the common good and general wel-
fare of all the people.5"
It is fundamental law in the United States that private property
can be appropriated under the power of eminent domain only if the
46Federal Aviation Program, 72 Stat. 737 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §1301(24)( 1965).
4 Supra note 34, at 615.48 Distinguishing between the police power and the power of eminent
domain is often difficult. The two have at least one common denominator -
the public health, safety or general welfare. JAHR, EM ENT DomIN 5
1953). However, eminent domain is exercised when there is a taking for a1public use" and the landowner is compensated for his loss. Police Power,
on the other hand, is the uncompensated injury or limitation placed upon
private property by the state when public needs require it. Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon' 260 U.S. 393 417 (1922).
49Ppev. Adirondaci Ry. 160 N.Y. 225, 237, 54 N.E. 689, (1899),
aff'd 176 U.S. 335 (1899).
C0 off v. Bird-in-Hand Turnpike Co., 128 Pa. 621, 18 Ad. 431 (1889).
SBlanton v. Fagerstrom, 249 Ala. 485, 31 So. 2d 330 (1947).
52 Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1923).
53 State ex rel. Polson Logging Co. v. Superior Court for Gray's Harbor
County, 11 Wash.2d 545, 119 P.2d 694 (1941).
11 JAlm, op. cit. supra note 48, at 17.
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property is to be devoted to a public use. Any attempt to ap-
propriate private property for a private use is unconstitutional
even though compensation may be paid for the property."5 How-
ever, the term "public use" is not capable of a precise definition."
The term is elastic and keeps pace with changing conditions."
Originally, public use meant a use by some governmental agency.
As long as the government exercised the right directly and for the
state's immediate benefit, no difficulty was experienced in deter-
mining what was a public use.58 Procurement of property for public
buildings and grounds was procurement for a public use. 9 It was
also considered a public use to acquire property by eminent domain
for highways, roads, railroads and parkways.6 These acquisitions
were permissible because the public at large was served.
There were a few exceptions to this early rule. These were cases
in which the government was allowed to condemn land for the
use of private individuals. These exceptions were based on two
theories - necessity and public welfare." In Head v. Amoskeag
Mfg. Co., 2 a state statute which authorized any person to erect and
maintain upon any stream a water mill and mill dam, paying the
owners of lands flooded by the dam damages assessed in a judicial
proceeding, was held constitutional. It did not deprive the property
owner of land without due process. The court justified this con-
demnation of land on the theory that the mill was a public service
and the owners were public servants because they could refuse
service to no one.
The same result was reached in water and electric power cases.
In Opinion of the Justices,"' the court stated that artificial light is
necessary for comfortable living. It is impossible for every in-
55 People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago, 394 IMI. 477, 68 N.E.2d 761(1946).
( 6)Chicago & No. W.Ry.Co. v. Morehouse, 112 Wis. 1, 87 N. W. 849
(1901).
5 7 Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining, & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83
Pac. 464 (1906).
5 8 Comment, 4 ST. Louis U.LJ. 316 (1957).59 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); Brehfass v. City of La
Crosse, 240 Wis. 619, 4 N.W.2d 125 (1942).6 0 Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890); In re Low, 233
N.Y. 334, 135 N.E. 521 (1922).
61 Comment supra note 58.
62 113 U.S. 9 (1884).
63 150 Mass. 592, 24 N.E. 1084 (1890).
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dividual to manufacture electricity for himself. Therefore, it must
be furnished by private companies or by government agencies.
Moverover, it cannot be distributed without the exercise of eminent
domain.
This early exception to the general rule of public use as being
necessary for the exercise of eminent domain has seen further
expansion today as the problems of a growing urban society have
increased. The public evils of slum areas are matters of state con-
cern since they vitally affect the health, safety and welfare of the
public. Therefore, the courts have upheld legislation authorizing
condemnation of property in furtherance of a government project
for slum clearance as being for a public use.64 When the question of
slum clearance and rehabilitation of substandard areas came before
the courts a novel concept of public use had to be devised by the
courts. This is because the substandard property which is acquired
by the municipality is often sold for development by private
parties.65
In New York City Housing Authority v. Miller,66 the court
discussed this novel concept of public use. It found that whenever
there arises a condition which is a substantial menace to the public
safety or welfare, it is the government's duty to use whatever power
is necessary to correct this problem.6" In considering the fact that
property taken by eminent domain might ultimately be sold to
private parties, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated:
The public end may be as well or better served through an
agency of private enterprise than through a department of the
government... We cannot say that public ownership is the sole
method of promoting the public purposes of community re-
development...."
The government has not stopped at condemnation for renewal
projects and urban redevelopment. Beautification of land is now
considered to be a public use. In In re Kansas Court Order
#39946,69 condemnation of offensive non-residential property along
64 New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d
153 (1936).
65 JAM, op. cit. supra note 48, at 17.
66270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).6 7 Id. at 340.68Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33(1954).69 298 Mo. 569, 252 S.W. 404 (1923).
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a boulevard was upheld. The court found even though the park-
way along the street was not traveled and was merely ornamental, it
tended to enhance the attractiveness of the state. This attractiveness
has an educational value and is enjoyable to people traveling
throughout the state. Thus, as courts more and more realize the
part that health plays in our life, they realize that aesthetic objects
are worthwhile in themselves and may justify the use of eminent
domain for such purposes."'
This extension of the concept of public use and the resulting
further limitation on a landowner's control of his property generally
cannot be criticized. The doctrine has simply expanded to meet
the challenge of an expanding world.
However, there is a conflict among state decisions concerning
the aggrieved landowner's right to challenge the inclusion of his
particular non-blighted property in a project. Many courts have
rejected such a challenge stating that the decision of what property
should be included in the plan lies exclusively within the discretion
of the agency.7 ' The courts will not allow a complaining land-
owner to controvert the finding of blight with extrinsic evidence
if there is substantial evidence in the planning stage records to
support the agency determination. 2
Indicative of the attitude of many courts is Kaskel v. Impeflitteri.7'
In this New York case, the taxpayer brought an action against city
officials to determine if the city officials had acted improperly in
acquiring realty for slum clearance. The court, in finding for the
defendant, stated that the situation was one in which the legis-
lature had authorized city officials to make a determination. The
making of this decision was simply an exercise of governmental
power. Because it is legislative in nature, whether wise or unwise,
the court cannot reverse it.
In Stockus v. Boston Housing Authority, 4 the plaintiffs ques-
tioned the constitutionality of an act by which the defendants
could declare their property substandard and order the property
7 0 Note, 23 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 730 (1955).
7' Note, 1964 DUX L.J. 123.72 Graham v. Houlihan, 147 Conn. 321, 329, 160 A.2d 745, 751 (1960).
73306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953).
74304 Mass. 507, 24 N.E.2d 333 (1939).
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vacated. After finding the law constitutional, the court considered
whether or not the defendants had exceeded their authority in
attempting to take the plaintiffs premises. The court found that
there are instances when men trained and experienced in special
subjects related to construction and sanitation might honestly differ
in determining whether a certain district is a slum area. In
considering the situation, the court stated that such a question is
not a debatable one and the court has no right to substitute its
judgment for the defendant's. The power to determine what areas
within its jurisdiction constitute substandard areas was conferred
upon the housing authority by the legislature.
However, a minority of courts have held an agency's determina-
tion to be judicially reviewable. In Offen v. City of Topeka,"' the
court held that the landowners could maintain an action for
injunctive relief when a municipal board of commissioners act in
an arbitary, capricious or illegal manner in passing a resolution
which leads to the taking of private property.
A landowner who cannot get a judicial review of the condemna-
tion of his property by redevelopment agencies is being deprived
of a prior existing right. It has been recommended that a statutory
reformation should be made to minimize the deficiencies in the
use of eminent domain in urban renewal projects." The proposed
legislation should give a property owner the right to appeal to a
court within a reasonable time after approval of the plan. Justiciable
issues would include determinations of whether the project area
is blighted and/or whether there has been an abuse of discretion.
Such a provision would give the landowner a fair opportunity to
question this further diminution of his property rights.
In a rapidly changing world, fundamental law cannot remain
static. It must be dynamic and progressive. It is therefore im-
possible to enumerate all the uses which may be classified as public
uses in order to authorize the acquisition of private property by
eminent domain. All that can be done is to predict that the concept
of public use will probably be expanded in the future.7
75 186 Kan. 389, 350 P.2d 33 (1960).
76 Supra note 71.
7 7 JAHIn, op. cit. supra note 48, at 25.
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Zoning
Zoning is a product of the twentieth century."8 It refers to the
separation of a municipality into districts. The buildings and
structures in such districts are regulated according to their con-
struction and the nature and extent of their uses. The districts
themselves are dedicated to particular uses designed to serve the
general welfare.7 9
Before the adoption of modem zoning laws, property owners
were restricted in the use of their property only by prohibitions
recognized at common law or by statute because the use was
detrimental to the rights of the public. As a result, haphazard
conditions existed in our municipalities with respect to the location
and utilization of buildings. Buildings were placed in close proxi-
mity without regard to community growth and this resulted in a
menace to public safety and the general welfare. Therefore, courts
were readily amenable to zoning regulations. In State ex rel.
Carter v. Harper,8" the court found that if zoning regulations
stabilized property values and added to the happiness and comfort
of the citizens then the general welfare was promoted. In City of
Aurora v. Burns,8' the court considered the constitutionality of
establishing zones to prevent congestion and to secure quiet
residential districts. In its discussion the court found that although
zoning is one of the most radical departures from the traditional
concept of private property in our times, the need for it is so great
that it has been accepted by all.
The early view of zoning recognized as its function the protection
of residential areas from encroachment by industrial and com-
merical enterprises which reduce the fitness of the neighborhood
for residential purposes. 2 In Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,83 the
constitutionality of an ordinance adopted by the village of Euclid
for regulating and restricting the location of trades, industries,
apartment houses and various other structures was questioned. The
7 8 P lTH OPH, THE LAw OF ZONiNG AND PLANNING 1 (1956).
79 Smith v. Collison, 119 C.A. Cal. 180, 6 P.2d 277 (1931).
80 186 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451 (1923).
81 319 III. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925).
62 Note, 17 VAum. L. REv. 1469, 1472 (1965).
83272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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court in it's discussion stated that the question involved was the
validity of what was really the crux of zoning legislation, namely,
the creation and maintenance of residential districts from which
every type of trade and business is excluded. The court followed
the broadening trend of cases which agree that the exclusion of
such buildings from residential areas bears a rational relation to
the health and safety of the community. Therefore, such a regula-
tion is not unreasonable and arbitrary, and it was held constitutional.
However, today, rather than excluding industry from certain
districts, the problem of preserving property for industrial use has
been growing particularly acute in expanding suburban areas. The
demand for residential property in outlying districts of large
metropolitan areas is great and as a result many subdivisions are
created. The community must then increase services to these
areas. To afford such services, revenue is necessary, and revenue
exists where there is industry. Thus there is an imperative need
to attract industry.84
As a result of this problem, zoning ordinances are being passed
to protect the available industrial sites. At first, these laws were
held unconstitutional.8 However, in 1956, a California district
court of appeals handed down the first United States decision
clearly upholding exclusive industrial zoning. 6 The landowners in
this case sought a residential building permit in an area zoned for
heavy industry. The court rejected the application and upheld
exclusive industrial zoning. Here the reasoning was not based
on protection of industry. The residential use continued to be
the solitary beneficiary of zoning protection. Three years later
the Supreme Court of Illinois upheld a zoning ordinance which
excluded future residences from a commercial and industrial area.8"
The court based its reasoning on the protection of industry and
commercial establishments, making this a significant decision.8
The extent to which other courts may follow this holding is yet
to be determined. In Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. City of Harvey,89
84 17 Vxrm. L. REv. supra note 82, at 1472.
85 Ibid.
86 Roney v. Board of Supervisors of Contra County, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740,
292 P.2d 529 (1956).
87 People ex rel. Stokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton
Grove, 16 I12.2d 183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959).
88 Comment, 11 W. REs. L. REv. 302 (1960).
8930 IMI. 2d 237, 195 N.E.2d 727 (1964).
[Vol. 69
15
Straub: Diminishing Property Rights
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967
STUDENT NOTE
an action was brought to have a zoning ordinance declared void
in so far as it changed the classification of the plaintiffs land from
residential to industrial. The court, although finding for the
plaintiff, indicated that had there been a reasonably immediate
industrial use the defendant would have prevailed. What courts
in the future may decide is subject to conjecture. However, in view
of past devisions, an expansion of the area of zoning is foreseeable-
with a further diminution of property rights resulting.
Conclusion:
Time and space here do not permit treatment of all the areas
wherein property rights have been diminished. The reader is
invited to consider also the areas of urban renewal, war uses, con-
demnation for highways and access thereto, and the current propo-
sitions with respect to civil rights. Property rights are not absolute
and a limited encroachment upon them seems to be necessary in
order to exist in today's world. In the words of one commentator,
As one looks back along the historic road traversed by the
law of the land in England and in America, one sees that a
change from the viewpoint that he who owns may do as he
pleases with what he owns, to a position, which hesitatingly
embodies an ingredient of stewardship; which grudgingly, but
steadily, broadens the recognized scope of social interest in the
utilization of things."9"
Although this evolution has been slow in the past, the rapid
development of the world today has brought about an increased
tempo in diminishing property rights. In order to prevent unneces-
sary, haphazard property restrictions, the legal profession must be
alert, well-informed and willing to take a role in this process.
Hazel Armenta Straub
90 5 PowEuL, REAL PnoPERTY 494 (1962).
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